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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to examine how patrol officer and complaint characteristics influence the 
timeliness of completing police misconduct investigations.  Further, it analyzes how the 
timeliness of the investigation influences the disposition and discipline of complaint 
investigations while controlling for relevant police officer and complaint characteristics. Data 
were collected from a Midwestern municipal police agency for all complaints filed against patrol 
officers from 2006-2015.  The analyses in this study demonstrate that the nature of the complaint 
and number of police officers present influences the length of the investigation.  This study also 
finds that police officer and complaint characteristics are relevant predictors of the disposition 
and discipline outcomes of complaint investigations. Policy implications are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The core meaning of police accountability in a democracy is being answerable to the 
public (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  Police are held accountable by the public through the 
services they provide, which include crime control, order maintenance, conflict resolution, 
problem solving, and provision of services (Kelling & Moore, 1989; Walker & Archbold, 2014). 
Confirming this idea, a statement that was found repeatedly in the internal affairs documents 
used as the main data source for this study stated that, “Public perception of any law enforcement 
agency is paramount to the success of that organization. The way a department conducts business 
is vital to the public’s perception of the agency and all of its members.”  This quote embodies the 
mission of law enforcement agencies in the community/problem solving era of policing as 
expounded upon by Kelling and Moore (1989).  Specifically, Kelling and Moore (1989) 
emphasize that this era of policing relies on an intimate relationship between police and citizens, 
which is accomplished through the services they provide.   
Police accountability has changed markedly since the inception of the first police 
agencies in the United States. Because of the focus on large northern cities, most accounts of the 
development of police do not consider the development of police accountability in the South. 
Reichel (1988), in addition to Walker (1992), recognize slave patrols as a type of specialized 
police organization that had a law enforcement function and accountability to a centralized 
governmental authority.  Because slave patrols shared these characteristics with modern 
agencies, they should be considered a precursor to modern police organizations and the starting 
point of accountability (Reichel, 1988; Walker, 1992). 
In the early 1700s, every slave state had laws for the regulation of slavery (Reichel, 
1988).  These laws were enforced by militias in addition to separate slave patrol entities.  Early 
slave patrols, such as the one created in the colony of Carolina in 1704, concerned itself with 
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catching runaway slaves and preventing uprisings (Reichel, 1988).  These slave patrols were held 
accountable by district commissioners who appointed them.  Further, slave patrols were expected 
to protect the colonial governments and property owners from slaves who were considered a 
dangerous class.  
In the Northern United States, metropolitan departments started to develop and the 
Political Era of policing began. Police in the Political Era borrowed their structure from Robert 
Peel’s London Metropolitan Police, who used the military model.  Adopting military principles 
to maintain effective supervision meant that officers would wear uniforms, hold military-style 
ranks, and be commanded by superior officers in an authoritarian manner (Walker, 1980).  In this 
era of policing, spanning from 1840 to 1900, holding police accountable for their actions was a 
difficult task.  Police officers were held accountable to political leaders whom they depended on 
for a job (Kelling & Moore, 1989).  Because policing was heavily influenced by politics, officers 
faced the consequence of losing their positions if political machines were not satisfied or re-
elected.   
Police in this era were also held accountable to the public for providing clean streets and 
distributing supplies to the poor.  Holding the police accountable while on the beat was also a 
challenging task. Before the invention of the radio, police officers would check in with their 
supervisor using a call box (Kelling & Moore, 1989).  This severely restricted a supervisor’s 
knowledge of what their officers’ conduct was like away from headquarters. Some critics of the 
Political Era of policing have pointed out that officers spent many hours of their shifts in saloons 
and barbershops drinking alcohol to lighten their workload (Walker, 1980).  Because of this, it is 
not far-fetched to believe that some officers spent their time on duty under the influence of 
alcohol, without their superior’s knowledge (Walker, 1980). 
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When accusations were made against the police alleging misconduct, there were usually 
few repercussions (Vollmer, 1933).  Corruption and violence, in the form of the “third degree” 
was often used and not investigated as misconduct.  Consequently, if a citizen had a complaint 
against an officer during this era, there was no official protocol for departments to follow.  This 
ultimately resulted in supervisors siding with the officers and the continuance of misconduct. 
Around 1850, police oversight boards began to develop to help hold law enforcement 
agencies accountable for their services (Wadman & Allison, 2004).  As police brutality and 
abuse grew more frequent, city leaders began to feel pressure to hold their police officers 
accountable.  This pressure, along with the help from influential figures, ushered in a new era of 
policing with new methods of accountability. With the help of August Vollmer, police agencies 
in the United States tried to become more professional.  Vollmer’s accomplishments included 
implementing crime prevention strategies, scientific investigations of crime scenes, reorganizing 
the chain of command, and revolutionizing police training and education (Wadman & Allison 
2004).  By encouraging the notion that police work was more than just a job, Vollmer worked 
with leaders around the country to make the police more accountable through professionalism. 
Because of Vollmer’s efforts, police accountability began to take different forms with the 
start of the Reform Era of policing beginning in 1900.  Police in the Reform Era were held 
accountable to their police administrators through enforcing the law and controlling crime 
(Kelling & Moore, 1989).   In addition, citizens began to become aware of police misconduct 
which resulted in a variety of ways to hold police accountable.  One way included an increase in 
lawsuits filed against the police (Archbold et al. 2006; Kappeler, 2001; Walker & Archbold, 
2014).  Furthermore, a major method of police accountability in this era was established by 
Supreme Court cases which restricted police discretion to control officer behavior (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014). Three examples of these cases include Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Tennessee v. 
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Garner (1985), and Miranda v. Arizona (1966).  Mapp v. Ohio (1961) held officers accountable 
by establishing the exclusionary rule.  The exclusionary rule holds that if an officer violates a 
person’s 4th and 5th Amendment constitutional rights to obtain evidence, it cannot be used against 
the person in court. In addition, Tennessee v. Garner (1985) determined that when a law 
enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, he or she may not use deadly force to prevent 
escape unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat 
to the officer or others. Lastly, Miranda v. Arizona (1966) required that police officers inform 
suspects of their rights upon taking them into custody. Over time, these Supreme Court cases 
have been one source for enhancing officer decision making to protect the constitutional rights of 
civilians.  Further, these cases have aided in the reform of police departments across the United 
States (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  
In addition to holding police officers accountable through the courts, a new mechanism 
by which police behavior could be monitored was beginning to be developed: internal 
investigations of police misconduct.  This idea was put forth by one of Vollmer’s disciples, O.W. 
Wilson. In his book, Police Administration (1952), sometimes referred to as the “bible of police 
professionalism” (Walker, 2003), Wilson refined Vollmer’s philosophies and developed 
department organizational structures which supported those philosophies.  In Wilson’s Second 
Edition of Police Administration, he recommends devoting resources to a division charged with 
the responsibility of recording, registering, supervising, and controlling the investigation of 
complaints against officers.  The complaint procedure, as explained by Wilson (1963) protects 
the reputation of the department through complete and objective investigations. In total, O.W. 
Wilson dedicated two pages to the discussion of complaint investigations.  Moreover, the Kerner 
Commission report conducted in 1968 found that formal complaint processes did not exist in 
many police agencies. Decades have passed since O.W. Wilson first introduced the idea of an 
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organizational structure that supports a complaint processes to professionalize the police. 
However, even in the early 1990s, just over half of the 100 largest police agencies in the United 
States had an official protocol for complaint investigations (Walker & Bumphus, 1992).  
As the police made efforts to become more professional through the adoption of new 
organizational structures, such as internal review of misconduct, questions remained regarding 
the attributes necessary to become a profession. According to Hall (1968), education and 
entrance requirements, in addition to attitudinal characteristics are important aspects of a 
profession.  Attitudinal attributes of a profession include the use of the professional organization 
as a major reference, belief in self-regulation, belief in service to the public, a sense of calling to 
the field, and autonomy (Hall, 1968). Research has shown that policing may not reach the 
professional standards set by Hall (1968).  Bumgarner (2001) asserts that many of those 
attributes are not observed and the term “professional” as it relates to policing is a misnomer.  
Nonetheless, departments over time have become more equipped to investigate officer 
misconduct.  
 Currently, in the Community/Problem Solving Era, there are more police accountability 
mechanisms than ever before.  One of the main accountability mechanisms includes 
investigations of complaints of police misconduct.  Complaints alleging officer misconduct can 
take the form of internal and external complaints.  Both citizens and officers can file complaints 
regarding any wrong they may have experienced. A citizen complaint process is a mechanism by 
which a police department can make itself accountable to the people it serves by hearing and 
investigating their complaints, and administering discipline to officers found guilty of 
misconduct. The right to file a complaint against the police is protected by the First Amendment 
to the Constitution.  The amendment specifically prohibits Congress from abridging "the right of 
the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution).  If the 
 6 
 
 
complainant believes that the officer was not operating within policy, it is the function of the 
investigation unit to determine the facts and decide the disposition of the complaint (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014). 
Complaint procedures are adversarial in nature and contain several elements resembling 
criminal proceedings (Black, 1976; Walker & Kreisel, 1996). These elements include a 
presumption of innocence for the accused officer during an investigation to determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the complaint. Lastly, following a sustained complaint, a 
disciplinary action is determined and carried out by internal affairs with a written notice to the 
complainant and accused officer. 
It is also necessary for departments to have an open and accessible complaint process 
(Walker & Archbold, 2014).  Internal Affairs is a critical entity in police departments that can 
impact the standards of investigating police misconduct.  Openness, integrity, and accountability 
are characteristics of an ideal complaint process (Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, 2007; Walker & Archbold, 2014). However, these ideal characteristics are important to 
the extent that police departments implement them into their standards.  One problem is that 
there is a lack of national standards regarding the investigation of internal and external 
complaints.  Chapter 52 of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA) requires that departments have a formal complaint process to become accredited.  
However, no details regarding the successful operation of a complaint process is made clear.  For 
example, CALEA’s 52.1.1 instruction states that a written directive requires all complaints 
against the agency or its employees be investigated, including anonymous complaints (Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007).   Still, one of the main shortcomings of these 
standards is that it provides no details pertaining to the protocols for complaint investigations, 
other than complaints should be investigated.  
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One characteristic of a properly functioning complaint process is the timeliness of 
investigating complaints of police misconduct.  However, staffing and managing the complaint 
investigation process remains a problem for agencies (Walker & Archbold, 2014). Additionally, 
CALEA recommends that departments have a written directive that specifies a time limit for 
completing an internal affairs investigation, with provisions for extensions.  Again, there is no 
guideline set as to what is an acceptable timeline for investigating complaints.  No research 
exists on the level of investigative effort that should exist as a standard for resolving complaints. 
The purpose of this study is to examine how patrol officer and complaint characteristics affect 
the timeliness of investigations of complaints.  Further, it will also analyze what factors influence 
the disposition and discipline while adding a new variable into the models: the length of the 
investigation.  When investigating complaints, police departments have the responsibility to 
investigate complaints against their officers in a timely and thorough matter (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014).  
For certain departments, this has not always been the case. From 2003 to 2006, the San 
Francisco Police Department (SFPD) took more than ten months to close 40% of sustained cases 
(San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints, 2011).  In addition, the SFPD returned 12% of 
those cases to the Office of Citizen Complaints stating that the SFPD did not have sufficient time 
to review the cases and consider discipline before the expiration of the one year statute of 
limitations. Neither the police chief or the police commission had an opportunity to determine 
whether the officer was guilty of misconduct, and officers who arguably should have been 
disciplined, counseled, or retrained were not. In addition to San Francisco, the Oakland monitor 
in 2004 found that there were delays at every stage of the complaint process (Oakland Police 
Department, 2004). 
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Many police departments have created formal timelines for the different stages of the 
complaint process.  The Independent Police Auditor of San Jose established a 30-day limit to 
classify each complaint, 180 days to complete investigations regarding use of force, and a limit 
of one year to complete investigations of all other complaints.  This came after it found that there 
were major delays in classifying complaints and completing complaints (IPA Report, 2003).  
One major drawback of establishing time limits to investigate police misconduct is that no 
repercussions exist if the time limit expires.   
This study is important from a procedural justice perspective.  The procedural justice 
perspective contends that the public’s view of the police is shaped by the way police and other 
legal authorities interact with them (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Because of this, it is possible 
confidence is lost when citizens perceive that the police do not treat them with fair and neutral 
treatment. Research shows that when citizen’s view police authority as procedurally just, they 
are more likely to cooperate with police and obey the law (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  From a 
procedural justice perspective, a delayed investigation may be perceived as the department not 
taking complaints seriously from the complainant’s perspective.  This may lessen the confidence 
citizens have in the police for investigating their own officer’s misconduct, making it less likely 
that misconduct is reported in the future. 
For example, loss of confidence in the police is demonstrated in the literature on the 
reporting of sexual assault. According to The National Violence Against Women Survey (2006), 
only 20% of women reported their sexual assault victimization to the police.  Notable reasons 
cited by victims of sexual assault not to report their assault are the fear of being perceived as 
blameworthy, not credible, or an overall lack of confidence in the police (Kerstetter, 1990; 
Schuller & Stewart, 2000).  Conducting interviews with 114 victims of sexual assault, 53% of 
participants stated that they did not report their assault because they were not confident in the 
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police.  In addition, other research suggests that victims of crime have less confidence in the 
police than non-victims (Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2003).  Taking this perspective, it is 
important to study the timeliness of investigations of police misconduct from a procedural justice 
perspective.   
 Because the process of investigating citizen complaints is designed to hold the officer 
accountable for their wrongful conduct, any delay in investigating a complaint could fail to 
correct that officer’s behavior (Walker & Archbold 2014). Research shows that persons are more 
concerned with the procedural features of law enforcement (National Research Council, 2004; 
Tyler, 2001).  Timeliness of complaint investigations has not been studied academically and 
research has not examined what influences the length of an investigation nor how the length of 
an investigation may influence the outcomes of the complaint.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Framework 
Maintaining trust with the community is one of the many goals for many modern police 
agencies.  Throughout history, the police have endured numerous challenges to this trust. As an 
institution of social control, citizens entrust the police with authority over their behavior.  Highly 
visible incidents of police misconduct have the potential to spark riots, public indictments of 
police practices, and public mistrust of the police (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).  Isolated instances of 
misconduct also have the possible consequence of harming the image of the police profession.   
One way that the police maintain a trusting image with the community is through 
procedural justice. Thibaut and Walker (1975) referred to procedural justice as a mechanism for 
making decisions about the allocation of outcomes. Their hypothesis was a person’s willingness 
to accept outcomes was linked to whether they were fairly decided on.  Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) demonstrated that people’s assessments of the fairness of third-party decision-making 
procedures shaped their satisfaction with their outcomes.  More recently, procedural justice 
scholars have moved from focusing on the decision-making function of procedures to 
interpersonal aspects of procedures (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002).  
 Procedural justice has become a popular concept in the scholarly literature on policing 
(Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 
2002).  The primary mechanism for establishing police legitimacy is procedural justice.  The 
procedural justice perspective argues that the legitimacy of the police is linked to public 
judgments about the fairness of the processes through which the police exercise authority 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  Sunshine and Tyler (2003) specifically expressed that procedural 
justice is “about the fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and 
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exercise authority” (p. 514). In short, if citizens perceive that the police treat them with dignity 
and respect while being fair and neutral, the legitimacy of the police is enhanced (Mazerolle, 
Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Studying 
legitimacy in the form of official citizen complaints, Terrill and Paoline (2015) found that, from 
the citizen’s perspective, discourteous or overly coercive officers threatened the legitimacy of the 
police as an institution.  
Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also examined the relationship between people's judgments 
about police legitimacy and their willingness to empower the police. Specifically, if the police 
are viewed as legitimate, they are given a wider range of discretion to perform their duties 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  Ultimately, it was found that empowerment was predicted by 
perceptions of legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler 2003). Although not studied directly, one of the 
duties of the police is to investigate allegations of police misconduct, and citizens empower this 
duty.   
One goal of the complaint process through a procedural justice perspective is to ensure a 
fair investigation.  A perceived lack of fairness from the complainant’s perspective is a major 
criticism of internal affairs (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  For example, in 2008, Joseph 
DeAngelis found that only 26.5% of complainants felt that the investigation was based on fact.  
Moreover, only 32.5% of the officers subjected to the complaint investigation felt it was 
unbiased.  From a procedural justice standpoint, legitimacy can be preserved by treating all 
officers equally and allow comprehensive investigations into any claims of misconduct (Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007).  When there are perceptions that the 
investigation is handled unfairly or unprofessionally, ramifications can be widespread and 
damaging to department morale and operations (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 
1990).  This is both true from the officer and citizen’s perspective.  Departments must ensure that 
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investigations treat both the citizen and officer fairly to enhance procedural justice and preserve 
legitimacy (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 1990).  
Complaint procedures also aim to provide satisfaction to individual complainants while 
enhancing the public perception of the police department.  Studying complaints of police 
misconduct from a procedural justice perspective, Walker (1997) uncovered cynicism about the 
complaint process.  Specifically, the focus groups emphasized the widespread belief that police 
departments cover up misconduct by their officers. An example includes one African-American 
male student stating that he believes that the police department will take care of its own.  In 
addition, another student said they would not file a complaint after the scenario because there 
were no witnesses and it would be the citizen’s word against the police officer’s.  Overall, only a 
few participants in Walker’s (1997) study believed that a complaint would produce any 
worthwhile results in the end.  When examining the goals that complainants would like to attain, 
Walker (1997) found that the most frequently mentioned goal among all participants was 
wanting to receive an apology. Further, some citizens wanted a face to face meeting with an 
officer to express themselves while others wanted the situation to be documented in case of 
another incident.  Walker’s (1997) study confirmed Sviridoff and McElroy's (1989) finding 
regarding the inconsistencies between complainant goals and official complaint procedures. 
This research emphasizes the importance of identifying principles that make the 
complaint process more procedurally just.  Examining the timeliness of the investigation is 
important to view through the lens of procedural justice and legitimacy.  Perceived injustice in 
the disciplinary process has the potential for negative consequences.  For example, using 
retrospective, longitudinal data from a large police department in the United States, Harris and 
Worden (2014) explored whether officers sanctioned more severely were less likely to be 
involved in future misconduct.  Compared to non-sanctioned officers, officers who received 
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more severe sanctions were more likely to obtain an additional sustained complaint.  These 
counterintuitive results were attributed to a perceived injustice during the disciplinary process, 
but, it is not apparent what type of injustice would warrant future misconduct.  Taking a defiance 
theory perspective, officers who rate their sanctions as unfair may feel stigmatized and alienated 
from the department, ultimately leading to future deviance (Sherman, 1993). 
The current study applies a procedural justice perspective to the process of investigating 
complaints of police misconduct.  By using the length of investigation as a new variable, it 
allows a look into how the outcomes of an investigation can be influenced.  Longer 
investigations have the potential to fail to hold the officer accountable for his or her actions.  
Holding a police officer accountable is sometimes difficult even when an officer is considered 
problematic. For an officer to be flagged by an early intervention system, they must reach a 
predetermined threshold for any number of significant events like a citizen complaint.  However, 
this pre-determined threshold varies substantially between departments.  Once an officer is 
flagged by an early intervention system, that officer is required to be monitored for a specified 
period of time (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  The problem is many departments only monitor an 
officer for a short time before the period resets and the officer is given a “clean slate” (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014; Davis et al., 2002) This means that it is possible for officers to amass several 
problematic indicators per monitoring period. In addition, a behavior known as the “officer 
shuffle” suggests that officers often switch departments without any new disciplinary action once 
they face scrutiny for problem behaviors (Rabe-Hemp & Braithwaite, 2012; Goldman, 2003; 
Goldman & Puro, 1987).   
From the complainant’s perspective, this can erode legitimacy.   From the department’s 
perspective, longer investigations risk sending the message that misconduct is tolerated, or that it 
is not important. Further, the added stress of a longer investigation could also have adverse 
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effects on officer behavior. Some research has posited that work-related stress of police officers 
can lead to excessive aggression and the use of force (Gershon, Lin, & Li, 2002; Kop, Euwema, 
& Schaufeli, 1999; Manzoni & Eisner, 2006).  The following sections will describe the 
challenges in using complaints as a data source and the ways past research has studied 
complaints of police misconduct.  
Validity of Complaints of Police Misconduct   
Questions remain about the inherent meaning of complaints and whether they are an 
adequate data source when it comes to examining police misconduct.  West (1988) described 
complaints against the police as an abused police statistic.  He asserted that an increasing number 
of complaints “filed with an agency may not reflect a deterioration in standards of officer 
behavior” (p. 113). West (1988) hasn’t been the only scholar to point out potential problems with 
citizen complaints.  For instance, other scholars have asked the question whether citizen 
complaints accurately reflect the extent of police misconduct due to problems of under and over-
reporting (Lersch, 2002; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996).     
Critics of citizen complaints cite issues of both underreporting and over reporting of 
allegations of police misconduct.  Regarding under-reporting, citizens may choose not to report 
police misconduct for several reasons (Lersch, 2002; Walker & Archbold, 2014; Walker & 
Bumphus, 1992).  Individuals may refuse to submit or withdraw a complaint because of a lack of 
confidence in the abilities of the police to monitor their officers or the complaint procedures are 
intimidating and/or complicated (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  The Mollen Commission (1994) 
reported that police officers often used or threatened to use brutality to intimidate their victims to 
protect themselves against the risk of complaints.   For example, in New York over a 5-year time 
span, it was revealed that over half of the complaint investigations were truncated.  Specifically, 
complainants withdrew, were uncooperative, unavailable, and could not be identified in these 
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allegations of police misconduct (New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2013). 
Further evidence of under-reporting was found by Walker and Bumphus (1992), who reported 
that only one-third of the people who believed that they had been mistreated by police officers 
pursued the matter by filing an official complaint.   
Under-reporting of complaints could also be exacerbated by the police subculture.  
Westley (1970) contended that a police subculture exists with a specific set of norms, meanings, 
values and behavior patterns unique to policing.  One behavior is known as the “code of silence,” 
in which police officers protect their fellow officers in situations involving misconduct 
(Goldstein, 1975).  This is a behavior within the culture of police departments that could create 
problems interpreting reporting and substantiation rates.  The code of silence involves not 
reporting other officer’s misconduct by claiming to have never seen it occur, lying to 
investigators, and even colluding with other officers to cover up evidence (Westley, 1970).  A 
report by the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints in 2001 revealed there were 99 
incidents of officers failing to cooperate with investigators, resulting in only 7 officers receiving 
a written reprimand (San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints, 2001).  The report found that 
the San Francisco Police Department routinely obstructed and delayed the Office of Citizen 
Complaints (OCC) investigations by changing document release practices, failing to respond to 
the OCC’s request for documents, withholding documents, refusing to provide signatures, mug 
shots, and taped interviews of the complainant’s statements (San Francisco Office of Citizen 
Complaints, 2001). Compounding this problem, Reiss (1973) stated that “police chiefs are 
notoriously reluctant to disclose information that would allow us to assess the nature and volume 
of complaints against the police” (p. 33).   
Using a method of multistage sampling, whereby 113 police departments with 925 police 
officers agreed to participate in an attitudinal survey regarding the abuse of authority, Weisburd 
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and colleagues (2001) discovered evidence of the code of silence.  Although their survey showed 
that more than 80% of American police do not accept that the code of silence as an essential part 
of their ability to police, about a quarter of the sample reported that whistle-blowing is not worth 
it because of the ways their police officers would treat them. More than two thirds reported that 
police officers were likely to be given a “cold shoulder” by fellow officers if they reported 
incidents of misconduct. Further, a majority reported that it was not unusual for police officers in 
their departments to turn a “blind eye” to misconduct by other officers (Weisburd et al., 2001).  
The Mollen Commission (1994), in its study of corruption in the New York City Police 
Department, found that officers who reported allegations of corruption suffered the penalties for 
being labeled a rat.  The majority of honest officers still protected the minority of corrupt officers 
through a code of silence few dared to break. 
 While some critics oppose the use of citizen complaints as a measure of police 
practices because of under-reporting of incidents (Reiss, 1968; Winick, 1987), over-reporting 
may also be an issue when studying citizen complaints.  Because they are citizen complaints, it is 
the citizen’s view or perception that the officer acted illegally or improperly.  There is the 
potential that the perception of a citizen is unlikely informed by rules or procedures transmitted 
by police departments for establishing uniform operating standards (Terrill & McCluskey, 2002).  
Being that substantiation rates of complaints typically fall between 0 and 25%, with a reported 
norm of 10% or less (Pate & Fridell, 1993), Adams (1995) has pointed to the low substantiation 
rate as evidence of over-reporting of unfounded acts of police misconduct.  This means that 
about 90% of the allegations of misconduct were not determined to be acts of misconduct at all.  
However, a low substantiation rate may not be a result of over-reporting as much as it could be a 
result of the police department’s reluctance to cooperate in the complaint process (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014).  
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Complaint research has revealed that a relatively small proportion of officers are 
responsible for a large proportion of complaints (Christopher, 1991; Harris, 2009, 2011; Lersch 
& Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001), but this has generally 
been linked to arrest activity and other measures of productivity (Hassell & Archbold, 2010; 
Lersch, 2002; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 1996). Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996), investigated the 
phenomenon of alleged rotten apples, or officers who were classified as repeat compared to non-
repeat offenders.  These researchers found that a small group of 37 officers (7%) accounted for 
over one-third of the total number of complaints filed over the three-year analysis.  However, 
they were also more likely to be accused of violent and non-violent harassment that was a result 
of proactive contact.  This finding contradicts the rotten apple theory by substituting in the good 
apple theory where citizen complaints of police misconduct are viewed as an indicator of 
productivity.  A disproportionate number of the complaints filed against the repeat offenders 
resulted from a proactive contact because officers in this analysis were actively seeking out 
crime and criminals while on duty. This suggests that if an officer is not generating 
dissatisfaction among the public, then the officer must not be doing his or her job by producing 
proactive contact.   
However, it is important to note that some practices of producing proactive contact with 
the public has come under scrutiny.  For example, the integrity of Stop Question and Frisk 
Programs have been questioned in recent years. While it creates higher numbers of proactive 
stops, it has been rated as harassing individuals based on suspicion rather than probable cause 
(Gau & Brunson, 2010). Therefore it is important to be cautious when labeling proactive contact 
as good behavior rather than examining the quality of the stops.  
In a follow-up study, Lersch (2002) sought to explore the relationship between the 
number of citizen complaints received and the officers’ level of productivity.  Productivity 
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measures utilized included the mean number of arrests (felonies, misdemeanors, and juvenile 
statuses), traffic citations, and field interview reports. The strongest relationships in this analysis 
were found between the total number of complaints and mean felony and misdemeanor arrests 
(Lersch, 2002).  While these relationships were of interest because they were significant and 
positive, others warranted further attention because of a lack of a significant relationship.  Field 
interview reports were a productivity measure that exhibited a weak positive relationship to 
citizen complaints (Lersch, 2002). 
Studying the relationship between measures of productivity and complaints, Brandl and 
associates (2001) controlled for different police officer characteristics such as sex, race, 
education, age, and length of service.  Productivity variables, including the number of arrests, 
officer assignment and patrol areas, and total arrests were used to predict the total number of 
excessive force complaints. They found that officers who made more arrests were also more 
likely to receive complaints of excessive force by citizens (Brandl et al., 2001).   Officer 
assignment and patrol areas, total arrests showed no relationship with total number of excessive 
force complaints.  Building off past research, Terrill and McCluskey (2002) examined the 
activities of officers with one or more complaints per year (complaint prone officers) versus 
officers with less than 0.21 complaints per year (non-problem officers).  Problem officers who 
had higher complaint rates were more active in terms of proactively confronting suspects and 
attempting to gather information in field interrogations.  This affirms that officers who are 
productive generate higher rates of complaints because they actively engage the public. More 
recent research has shown that average number of citations influences the frequency of formal 
complaints (Hassel & Archbold, 2010). The more citations an officer issues will result in an 
increase in complaints.  One question that stems from more productive officers receiving 
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increased number of complaints is whether the complaints are valid ones. Future research should 
establish the credibility and validity of complaints from more productive officers. 
Despite the adversarial nature of citizen complaints, they remain a good data source for 
scholars studying police misconduct. To defend the use of citizen complaints as an indicator of 
police practices, Lersch and Mieczkowski (2000) analyze a second measure of police behavior: 
internal allegations of misconduct.  These scholars explore the idea that if it could be determined 
that there are similarities in the number and type of internal departmentally-initiated complaints 
and external citizen-initiated complaints, support would be provided for the use of allegations of 
misconduct as a data source. Results of the analysis suggested that there was convergence 
between the citizen complaints and the internal allegations of misconduct. Officers who had at 
least one citizen complaint were more likely to have at least one internal allegation of 
misconduct (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000).  Specifically, of the 259 officers who received at 
least one citizen initiated allegation of misconduct, a statistically significant 33.6% had also 
received at least one internally initiated allegation, which was higher than the proportion of all 
officers who were named in at least one internally generated complaint (23.7%).  Further, when 
compared to the whole department, citizen identified problem officers were nearly twice as likely 
to be named in at least one internal allegation of misconduct.  
Consistent with Lersch and Mieczkowski (2000), Harris (2011) explored the relationship 
between internal and external complaints longitudinally. Collecting data from computerized 
records for all sworn officers who were employed by this agency over a fifteen-year period, it 
was demonstrated that internal and citizen complaints had a substantial degree of association 
within both high-rate groups.  This indicated that both internal and external complaints are valid 
predictors of an underlying tendency for misconduct (Harris 2011). Generally, officers with 
higher rates of citizen complaints also exhibited higher rates of internal complaints, with the 
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reverse is also true (Harris, 2011). These studies highlight that, for the most part, citizens and 
departments identify the same officers as problematic.   
Although not a perfect data source to identify problem officers (Walker & Archbold 
2014), there are few other ways to pinpoint unruly officers. Complaints of police misconduct are 
data that are an important part of information management for police agencies and one part of a 
broader plan to hold the police accountable (Walker & Archbold, 2014). As a supervision 
mechanism, complaints offer supervisors a direct way of monitoring police officer conduct 
(Walker & Archbold 2014).  Complaints are also one important part of an early intervention 
system (EIS), which allow police officers to be supervised based on several measures of police 
behavior, one measure being complaints.  The rationale behind EISs is straightforward. By 
monitoring and responding to problematic officer behavior, such as receiving high rates of 
complaints, departments can reduce the number of incidents that erode police legitimacy. 
Because employee performance is continually assessed by supervisors (Walker, Milligan, & 
Berke, 2006), it allows organizations to intervene in addressing unsatisfactory performance.   
A National Institute of Justice study conducted by Walker and associates (2001) found 
significant reductions in use of force and citizen complaints among officers identified by EISs in 
three agencies.   On the other hand, using data collected from the 2003 and 2007 Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) surveys, Shjarback (2015) 
investigated patterns in rates of citizen complaints of use of force among 94 departments that 
implemented an EIS and found no reductions in complaint rates of use of force.  Aside from the 
mixed findings regarding EI systems (Shjarback, 2015; Walker et al., 2001; Worden et al., 2013), 
methods of supervision stress the role that data collection and analysis can play in an agency to 
identify problem officers (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  
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Whether it is problems of over-reporting, under-reporting, or using officer productivity to 
measure citizen complaints, each perspective calls into question the inherent meaning of a 
complaint or what complaints represent. Whichever way complaints are examined, one thing 
remains constant.  That is, police misconduct remains a serious problem in American society and 
complaints are one of few data sources to explore.    
Research on Citizen Complaints 
Most of the academic literature on citizen complaints can be organized based off of 
studies about the characteristics of officers who have complaints filed against them (Brandl et al., 
2001; Hassell & Archbold, 2010; Hickman, Piquero, & Greene, 2000; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
1996, 2000; Liederbach, Boyd, Taylor, & Kawucha, 2007; Pate & Fridell, 1993; Wagner, 1980) 
and the receipt and processing of complaints (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001; Griswold, 1994; 
Hassell & Archbold, 2010; Hickman, 2006; Hickman et al., 2000; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; 
Littlejohn, 1981; Pate & Fridell, 1993; Wagner, 1980; Worrall, 2002).  For instance, some 
literature examines the effects of officer demographics on the likelihood of receiving complaints. 
Officer Variables 
Officer Sex 
Two officer demographic variables have shown to be significant predictors of complaints.    
Researchers have been interested in whether citizen complaints against officers are correlated 
with officer gender; some pointing out that a female officer is less inclined to garner complaints 
than a male officer for similar behaviors (Bazley, Lersch, & Mieczkowski 2007; Bergeron, 
Archbold, & Hassell, 2008; Brandl et al., 2001 Hassell & Archbold, 2010;  Lersch, 1998; Lersch 
& Mieczkowski, 1996; McElvain and Kposowa, 2004; National Center for Women and Policing, 
2002; Pate and Fridell, 1993; Steffensmeier, 1979; Van Wormer, 1981; Wagner, 1980).  
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Examining a total of 640 citizen complaints against 827 officers between 1971 and 1973, 
Wagner (1980) questioned whether officer sex influenced the likelihood of a complaint being 
filed. Male officers accounted for 99.9% of the agency and accounted for all but one complaint 
of police misconduct.  In the San Jose Police Department, the Independent Police Auditor 
received a total of 664 complaints of excessive force against officers between 1996 and 2001. 
Only 2.9% of these complaints named female officers, although women constituted 8.7% of their 
sworn personnel.   
To obtain a national picture on police use of force using citizen complaints, Pate and 
Fridell (1993) selected a representative sample of 1,697 law enforcement agencies from the total 
population of 15,801 agencies in the United States.  The surveys were mailed to the 1,697 
agencies and asked for use-of-force data for the previous year. After a series of follow-ups, the 
researchers received 1,111 completed surveys (a 65.5% response rate). Among sheriffs’, county, 
and city departments that completed the survey, male officers were overrepresented among those 
receiving complaints. However, in state agencies, male officers were not overrepresented among 
those receiving complaints.  Using citizen allegations of misconduct filed with the internal affairs 
office of a large municipal police department in the Southeastern United States, Lersch (1998) 
explored gender differences in complaints of misconduct filed against police officers.  
Specifically, Lersch (1998) investigated if male officers were overrepresented in allegations of 
misconduct. She found that while women were less likely to be accused of misconduct, no 
significant difference was found in the type of complaint filed against male and female officers.  
In a content analysis, The National Center for Women and Policing (2002) collected data 
on citizen complaints of excessive force, in addition to sustained allegations of police 
misconduct. The data indicated that male officers were two to three times more likely than their 
female counterparts to be named in a citizen complaint for excessive force. More recently, using 
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data from an urban police department in the southern U.S., Bazley, Lersch, and Mieczkowski 
(2007) found that while male officers received more complaints on the use of excessive force 
than female officers, female officers responded with a narrower range of force continuum than 
male officers, and were less likely to resort to lethal force than male officers. 
Brandl, Stroshine, and Frank (2001) studied officer characteristics in the form of arrest 
activity, age, and gender, and possible correlations with those variables and citizen complaints.  
Collecting data from a large mid-western municipal police department with an internal affairs 
bureau, these researchers found that gender was correlated with receiving a complaint. 
Specifically, male officers were more likely to receive complaints than their female counterparts, 
and female officers were less likely to employ physical force against citizens when they made 
arrests than were male officers. Consequently, female officers in this study were less likely to 
receive citizen complaints related to the use of excessive force against citizens.  
Officer Years of Service 
Researchers have also been interested in the effect that years of service has on the 
frequency of receiving complaints.  Early observations of police work noted that younger 
officers are often ‘gung ho’ in their job performance (Van Maanen, 1979).  Seeking to prove 
themselves to the agency, these officers often took command over citizens with no hesitation to 
apply coercive authority (Hunt, 1985). Less experienced officers have also been identified as 
‘hungry’ and willing to do more to detect crime and criminals (Friedrich, 1977; Worden, 1989).  
For these reasons, officers with less police experience are more likely to be named in complaints 
of police misconduct (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
2000; McElvain and Kposowa, 2004). Cohen and Chaiken (1972) found that younger officers 
were more likely to have complaints filed against them.  The officers in Wagner’s (1980) study 
with a shorter length of service received most complaints.  McElvain & Kposowa (2004) 
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investigated whether there was a relationship between police officer characteristics and internal 
affairs investigations for allegations of use of force.  Data for this study were gathered from 
personnel files of officers employed by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department for the years 
1996 through 2000.  The strongest predictor of internal affair investigations for use of force in 
the analyses was departmental experience. The typical officer that was investigated for alleged 
uses of force was a young male with less than ten years of experience working in the Sheriff’s 
Department, and had been investigated for prior allegations (McElvain & Kposowa, 2004).  
More recently, Harris (2010) studied the careers of officers who received internal 
complaints filed by another employee in the agency.  Specifically, it was shown that the typical 
active officer’s complaint career began in year four, continued for five years before desisting in 
the middle of the ninth year of experience. A curvilinear relationship between length of service 
and receiving complaints was found by Terrill and Ingram (2016).  Less experienced officers, for 
example, were significantly more likely to receive complaints, while more experienced officers 
were less likely to generate complaints.   
Since previous research has found officer variables to influence the frequency at which 
officers have complaints filed against them, it is important to examine whether these same 
characteristics influence the length of investigations of police misconduct in addition to the 
outcomes of investigations.  By including these variables in the analysis, it will provide a better 
understanding of the factors that affect the dependent variables in this study.   
Complaint Variables 
Frequency of Complaints 
Most studies on complaints of police misconduct focus on the frequency of 
complaints (Lersch, 1998, 2002; Hickman, 2006; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; Pate & 
Fridell, Wagner, 1980).  Pate and Fridell (1993) focused on complaints for use of force, and 
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collected data via 1,111 agencies. A total of 840 agencies provided data on citizen complaints 
about police use of force. It was reported that 15,608 complaints existed during 1991, with rates 
of complaint varying by size and type of agency.  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has collected data on citizen complaints from 
police departments in multiple waves of their Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics (LEMAS) survey program.  The LEMAS data provide information on the volume and 
rate of complaints, as well as complaint dispositions.  The 2002 LEMAS revealed that large state 
and local law enforcement agencies received more than 26,000 citizen complaints about officer 
use of force (Hickman, 2006).  This total figure resulted in overall rates of 6.6 complaints per 
100 full-time sworn officers; however, rates were higher among large municipal police 
departments, with 45 complaints per agency, and 9.5 complaints per 100 full-time sworn 
officers. Most force complaints (22,238 or 84% of all complaints) were received by large 
municipal police departments. On a per agency basis, rates ranged from 7 per agency among 
those with less than 250 fulltime sworn, to 214 per agency among those with 1,000 or more 
officers (Hickman 2006). 
However, Hickman (2016) warns against the validity of LEMAS as a source of complaint 
data because it suffers from serious measurement flaws.  Some of these flaws stem from law 
enforcement agencies that report to the LEMAS use different recording behaviors.  These 
recording behaviors include combining citizen complaints with internal complaints, combining 
citizen complaints with officer-reported uses of force, and reporting total complaints 
investigated, rather than complaints received. Administrative factors, including the overall 
quality of agency records as well as procedures related to complaint processing, may vary across 
departments. In addition, the categories and definitions of complaint dispositions used in 
LEMAS may not be used by all agencies. Some agencies may record multiple dispositions, or 
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other unique outcomes.  Only examining force complaints also limits the scope of analysis.  
Force complaints represent a subset of all force events, which means not all force events result in 
citizens filing formal complaints. Data from the 2002 Police-Public Contact Survey indicated 
that although 75% of citizens experiencing force thought the level of force used was excessive, 
about 10% filed a complaint with the agency employing the officer (Hickman, 2006).  The 
current study avoids these issues by separating internal complaints from external complaints, 
separating the nature of complaints received, and examining a variety of types of complaints.  
Nature of Complaints 
There is a wide variety of the nature of complaints that departments receive.  Research 
has demonstrated that complaints can include verbal discourtesy (Dugan and Breda, 1991; 
Littlejohn, 1981), illegal arrests (Kerstetter, 1996), and excessive force (Pate & Fridell, 1993).  
The lack of consistency in classification of complaints, makes it difficult to directly compare the 
results from studies concerning the types of complaints filed. In a review of the Detroit Police 
Department, Littlejohn (1981), reported a rate of 24% for demeanor-related complaints while 
Griswold (1994) found that only 13.9% of the complaints filed against a metropolitan police 
department in Florida alleged acts of discourtesy or harassment.  Recently, Terrill and Ingram 
(2016) discovered that improper force and discourtesy were two of the most frequent complaints 
in six of the eight departments under examination.  More specifically, 42% of all citizen 
complaints across the eight agencies were for allegations of excessive force or discourtesy. 
The most common externally generated citizen allegations in Lersch and Mieczkowski’s 
(2000) study were related to officer performance. This category included inefficiency and 
carelessness, and accounted for 32.2% of the citizen allegations. Complaints concerning 
demeanor were the second most commonly named category, accounting for 29.6% of the citizen 
allegations, while complaints alleging the use of unnecessary force were the third most common 
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allegation, accounting for 22.1% of the citizen complaints.  Turning their attention to internal 
allegations of misconduct, performance related complaints were also the most common category, 
with 31% of the internal allegations falling within this type. While demeanor and unnecessary 
force on the other hand were common citizen complaints, they were the least frequently cited 
categories of internal complaints. Over a three-year period of analysis, there was not one internal 
complaint in which an officer had been accused of the use of unnecessary force. Examining 
complaints of police misconduct in a sheriff’s office, Lersch and Kunzman (2001) found a total 
of 356 administrative allegations were filed against 154 deputies.  Regarding policy violations, a 
total of 51 were filed against 35 deputies and investigated by internal affairs.  
Researchers have also been interested in what influences the nature and type of complaint 
that is being filed.  For example, officers who are classified as repeat offenders were more likely 
to be accused of both violent and non-violent harassment of citizens (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
1996).  Officers with fewer complaints, on the other hand, were more likely to be accused of 
dissatisfactory performance of duties (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996).  Classifying complaints 
into demeanor-related, performance-related, and allegations of force, (Lersch 2002) found the 
mean number of felony and misdemeanor arrests to be significantly correlated with all the 
complaint types. In addition, higher numbers of traffic citations were found to be correlated with 
the number of demeanor and force complaints an officer received, however not with performance 
related allegations.   
Disposition of Complaints 
Once a complaint has been investigated, internal affairs must decide on a disposition. In 
Pate and Fridell’s (1993) analysis, agencies were asked to indicate the disposition of each citizen 
complaint of excessive force. Agencies were asked whether the complaint was unfounded, if the 
officer was exonerated, if the complaint was “not sustained”, or if it was sustained.  Unfounded 
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complaints were complaints that were found not to be based on fact or that the reported incident 
did not occur, while being exonerated means that the incident occurred but the action taken by 
the officer was lawful and proper. A complaint that was not sustained means that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegation against the officer, while a sustained 
complaint is one where there is sufficient evidence for disciplinary action. After the surveys were 
collected, 830 agencies provided information on the disposition of the complaints.  Per their data, 
city police departments had among the highest percentages of sustained complaints (10.1%). The 
rate of unfounded complaints in city departments was 33.7% while the officer was exonerated 
35.3% of the time.  As city departments became larger, the data showed lower rates of 
complaints that were sustained, while the smaller departments reported greater percentages of 
complaints in which the officer was exonerated (Pate & Fridell, 1993).  
Regarding the LEMAS data gathered by Hickman (2006), the most common disposition 
for force complaints received by municipal police departments was not sustained (37%). 
Twenty-five percent of force complaints in these agencies were unfounded, and 23% of the 
officers were exonerated, resulting in 8% of force complaints being sustained. In Terrill and 
Ingram’s (2016) eight city examination, 11% of the complaints were sustained across cities. St. 
Petersburg sustained 29% of all complaints while Portland sustained 2% of all complaints. When 
examining the type of complaint, improper force complaints were sustained 2% across all 
agencies, while discourtesy complaints were sustained at a rate of 9%. 
Research on complaints of police misconduct has attempted to find predictors of the 
disposition of complaints.  In Hassell and Archbold’s (2010) analysis, it was demonstrated that 
the type of complaint influenced the disposition of complaints.  Complaints for police action 
such as physical complaints, allegations of police use of force, and nonphysical complaints were 
less likely to be sustained than complaints for work performance issues and departmental policy 
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violations. Complaints for use of force, harassment, abuse of authority and verbal threats are not 
sustained as often as complaints for failure to fulfill duties, failure to document evidence, or 
verbal discourtesy and improper action (Hassell & Archbold 2010).  In addition, it was 
demonstrated that a complaint was more likely to be sustained if only one officer was present 
rather than if two or more officers were present (Hassell & Archbold, 2010).  Regarding gender, 
Terrill and Ingram (2016) found that male officers were significantly less likely to receive 
sustained dispositions.  Lastly, complaints filed against officers classified as repeat offenders 
were less likely to be sustained in Lersch and Mieczkowski’s (1996) analysis. When examining 
complaints against non-repeat offenders, 12.6% were upheld by internal affairs, while 8.4% of 
the complaints filed against non-repeat offenders were sustained. In a more recent study, Headly 
et al. (2017) found that higher ranked police officers were more likely to receive an unfounded 
decision. In addition, the more misconduct allegations a police officer has increased the 
probability that the allegation was not sustained (Headly et al. 2017).  In this study, police 
officers with a greater number of disciplinary actions were more apt to have their misconduct 
allegation sustained.   
Disciplinary Action of Complaints 
Once a complaint has been sustained, a police agency decides whether any disciplinary 
action will be imposed on the officer.  Disciplinary action can range from a verbal consultation 
to termination of the officer’s position within the department. Pate and Fridell’s (1993) analysis 
yielded 228 out of 1,111 departments reporting information describing the type of discipline that 
was administered following the complaints that were sustained.  In city departments, reprimands 
constituted 32.6% of discipline administered while suspensions accounted for 41.8%.  
Reassignments resulted in 0% of the discipline from sustained complaints while termination 
accounted for 13.6% of discipline in city departments.  Few studies have sought to explore the 
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predictors of the type of discipline that officers face once a complaint has been sustained.  Manis 
et al. (2010) remains one of the few studies to find a significant predictor of disciplinary action.  
That is, less experienced officers were more likely to receive disciplinary action following the 
formal investigative process (Manis et al. 2010). 
Characteristics of Complainants 
Albeit in a limited fashion, researchers have also been interested in the characteristics of 
complainants. Pate and Fridell’s (1993) revealed that, in city departments, 72.8% of complaints 
were from males while 27.2% came from females.  Compared to their baselines in the general 
population, a noticeable overrepresentation of males complaining of excessive force was evident.  
Among complaints that were sustained, 82.9% were male and 17.1% were female.  One reason 
to expect males to file more complaints than females is to look at their chances of having contact 
with the police.  Previous research has shown that males are more likely to be stopped, searched, 
have force used against them, and arrested than females (Contacts between Police and the Public, 
2002).  The limited amount of multivariate analyses examining differences in complainant’ sex 
has failed to find any relationships (Lersch, 1998). 
Situational Variables 
Situational variables have also been used in studies that have examined police officer 
behavior.  Situational explanations of police behavior are grounded in a sociological perspective 
in social control and the impact of social structure on police behavior (Black, 1980; Worden, 
1989).  Egon Bittner, for example, stressed the importance of situational factors when he studied 
the police.  Specifically, he stated that “the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism 
for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of 
an intuitive grasp of situational emergencies (Bittner 1995; p.23).”  Sociologists, for example, 
have tended to see the behavior of the individual as externally influenced, as a response to the 
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environment that the individual is a part of.  Situational variables have been analyzed in terms of 
how they influence official police action while a smaller body of literature has examined how 
they influence citizen complaints.  
The number of officers present at a citizen encounter has been hypothesized to affect 
police behavior. Uchida and associates (1988) explored the factors affecting officer injuries.  
They found that officer attributes were unrelated to injury, as were suspect gender, race, and type 
of weapon used by the officer; however, like Margarita (1980) and Wilson and Meyer (1990), it 
was discovered that officers were more likely to be injured when there were more than one 
officer present. When alone, an officer may be more cautious and less threatening than when 
accompanied by other officers (Wilson, 1963). For example, Friedrich (1980) analyzed data 
gathered in the observational study undertaken by Reiss (1968) for the President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.  Observers recorded detailed information 
on encounters between police and citizens, as well as on the police themselves.  Regarding 
multiple officers at the scene and the use of excessive force, two-man units were more likely to 
use force than one-man units (Friedrich, 1980).  In addition, the analyses showed that the more 
officers there were at the scene, the more likely it is that force was used. In an archival study in 
San Diego, Boydstun, Sherry, and Moelter (1977) found lone officers were more likely to take 
crime reports, but found lone officers more likely to make arrests.  Lone officers also produced 
fewer citizen complaints in encounters involving resisting arrest than those encounters involving 
two or more officers.  Worden’s (1989) and Terrill and Mastrofski’s (2002) research also 
revealed that multiple officers on scene increased the likelihood that the citizen would 
experience force.  Examining force in the connection to arrests, Garner and associates (1995) 
found that arrestees were more likely to experience force when there was an increased police 
presence. Having an increased police presence may be a result of a dangerous situation in which 
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there needs to be more back-up for police officers.  This may increase the likelihood of formal 
action taking place. 
 Exploring the disposition of the complaint investigation, Hassell and Archbold (2009) 
found that a complaint was more likely to be sustained if only one officer was present rather than 
if two or more officers were present. It is possible that police officers change their behavior 
when additional officers are present.  Officers may feel like they need to prove something to 
their peers and end up acting in a more aggressive manner than what the situation calls for 
(National Research Council, 2004). 
Timeliness of Investigations 
 Completing complaint investigations in a timely manner remains a problem for some 
police agencies in the United States (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  The Negotiated Settlement 
Agreement, Second Semi-Annual Report conducted by an independent monitoring team revealed 
that over an 11 month period a total of 261 complaints with 630 allegations of misconduct were 
reviewed by the Oakland Police Department.  The monitor found systemic delays at nearly every 
step of the process, with few internal mechanisms designed to prevent such delays.  Specifically, 
59% of the complaints were still open at the time of the review and 49% had been completed.  
The investigations of those complaints that were completed took an average of seven months to 
complete while the average duration of those investigations that were still open was four months.  
The independent monitoring team was especially concerned with investigations of level 1 uses of 
force complaints, which are required to be completed within 75 calendar days of the incident. Of 
15 Level 1 cases reviewed by the independent monitoring team, only one was completed within 
this timeframe.    
The report also highlighted that, “the most striking overall finding is the failure of OPD’s 
structure as a whole to support the internal investigations process. For example, firm deadlines 
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within the investigative process are sparse, and the deadlines that are in place are routinely not 
met” (p.vii).  Moreover, the Oakland Police department routinely failed to discipline officers 
despite sustained misconduct findings because the investigation took longer than one year to 
complete. Exacerbating the problem is the OPD’s failure to enforce deadlines and hold 
commanders accountable when investigations stop under their watch. Tracking the progress of 
investigations was also found as a deficiency by the independent monitor, in some cases files 
disappearing after the retirement of the internal affairs personnel.  
Little is known about what factors influence the time it takes to investigate allegations of 
police misconduct.  To date, no published research has looked at this question.  Previous research 
has demonstrated that officers who are more productive receive more complaints (Lersch 2002; 
Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996).  It is important to investigate whether misconduct by more 
productive officers take longer to investigate because attention is repeatedly drawn to their 
behaviors.  It is also plausible that repeat offenders, or officers with a previous complaint are 
investigated differently for the same reason.  Officers with prior complaints may be perceived to 
be guilty because internal affairs are used to reviewing that particular officer’s behavior.  
Consequently, investigations may be sped up.  However, without previous research, that 
speculation cannot be confirmed.   
It is also possible that officer characteristics influence the time it takes to investigate 
allegations of misconduct.  Research has demonstrated that officers with less experience are 
more likely to have citizen complaints filed against them and more likely to have complaints 
sustained (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000; 
McElvain and Kposowa, 2004).  Because of these findings, it is important to investigate whether 
more time is devoted to investigating officers with less experience as opposed to officers with 
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more.  It is also necessary to investigate the possible effect that officer gender could have on the 
duration of investigating complaints. 
Complaint characteristics could also influence the amount of time devoted to 
investigating allegations.  For example, more serious allegations, such as use of force could 
require more time to investigate because the investigation may rely on more evidence which 
would need to be gathered and analyzed.  On the other hand, more serious allegations could 
result in the streamlining of resources, ultimately shortening the length of an investigation.  
Situational factors also have the potential to influence the amount of time it takes to 
investigate allegations of police misconduct.  Having more officers involved in the complaint or 
at the scene of the incident, if it is externally generated may impact the duration of the complaint.  
Having more officers involved in a complaint could mean that there are more witnesses to 
interview, which could take longer, or, speed up an investigation because there are more 
witnesses to corroborate one side of the encounter.    
Not only is it necessary to investigate what influences the amount of time taken to 
investigate allegations of misconduct, it is also important to examine whether the duration of the 
investigation influences the outcomes of the complaint while holding all other variables constant.  
One outcome of the complaint investigation is the disposition, or whether the complaint is 
sustained or not sustained.  Another outcome of the complaint is the type of discipline given to 
the officer.  As was found in the Oakland Police Department, officers were routinely not 
disciplined even after sustained complaints because a large amount of time elapsed from the 
incident to the investigation. From a procedural justice standpoint, it is then necessary to analyze 
whether the time it takes to investigate allegations of police misconduct influences the 
disposition and discipline that officer receive.  This study contributes to the existing body of 
 35 
 
 
literature on complaints of police misconduct by introducing a new variable; timeliness of 
investigations. The following research questions were designed for this study:  
1. Are there differences in the timeliness of the investigation based on the nature, 
disposition, and discipline of the complaint? 
2. What factors influence the length (timeliness) of investigations of complaints against 
patrol officers? 
3. How does the length (timeliness) of investigation of complaints against patrol officers 
affect the disposition of the investigation?  
4. How does the length (timeliness) of investigation of complaints against patrol officers 
affect the discipline recommendation of the investigation?  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
Most of the studies on complaints of police misconduct are quantitative in nature (Brandl, 
Stroshine, & Frank, 2001; Dugan & Breda, 1991; Harris, 2009; Hassell & Archbold, 2010; 
Hickman, 2006; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; Liederbach, Boyd, Taylor, & Kawucha, 
2007; Manis, Archbold, & Hassell, 2008; Terrill & McCluskey, 2002). The purpose of this study 
is to continue the quantitative dialogue on complaints of police misconduct from a procedural 
justice perspective. The persistence to study complaints of police misconduct from the 
procedural justice perspective has been alluded to in recent research (Terrill & Paoline, 2015). 
Since people’s evaluations of institutions are tied to outcomes (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), it is 
necessary to examine what influences those outcomes.   This research follows suggestions made 
by previous studies by tapping into another dimension of procedural justice: the timeliness of the 
investigation. 
Research Site  
A Midwestern, municipal police agency in the USA that employs 168 sworn police 
employees was used as the research site for this study. Only complaints filed against patrol 
officers will be included in the data analysis for this paper. The data used in this study were 
collected from 144 sworn patrol officers. The department is located in a city with a population of 
118,523 people (US Census, 2015). The city’s economy has historically been dependent 
on agriculture, however, that has decreased substantially in recent decades.  Now, the city has a 
growing economy based on manufacturing, technology, retail trade, higher education, and 
healthcare.   
According to 2010 Census figures, racial composition of the city includes 90.2% White, 
2.7% African American, and 7.1% other races (including American Indian, Asian, 
Hispanic/Latino, or some combination of races).  The police department has 5 community 
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service officers, 12 support specialist staff, and 5 civilian staff.  From 1999 to the present, this 
department has had three Chiefs of Police. The police population is predominantly male (87%) 
and White (97%), while the average length of service for officers named in the complaints is 
8.06 years of service, with a range of 0 to 33 years of service.  
Data  
All complaints filed against patrol officers from 2006-2015 were collected with the help 
of the Fargo Police Department’s (FPD) Internal Affairs division. The data set allows for an 
examination of a wide range of variables.  These variables include details regarding the nature, 
disposition, and discipline of all complaints filed against patrol officers in this police department. 
Each complaint also identified how many officers were on the scene when incidents took place 
that resulted in complaints of police misconduct, and if any formal action took place leading up 
to the complaint being filed.  
With the help of the FDP’s crime analyst, data were collected for two measures of 
productivity: total number of arrests and total number of citations written from 2006-2015.  The 
total numbers of the productivity measures were divided by 10 (ten years of data) to produce an 
average number of arrests and citations (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). Lastly, with the approval 
from IRB, demographic information for all sworn patrol officers was collected from the Human 
Resources Division within the city of Fargo. Information collected for all patrol officers includes 
officer sex and years of service. Officer race was not collected as there were mostly White patrol 
officers (98%).  Information regarding education was also not collected because prospective 
applicants must have completed the equivalent of a two-year education at an accredited college 
or university, have an associate's degree, or 60 semester credits.  The result of this requirement 
yielded little variation, therefore, education is not included in the analysis. 
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Variables  
Dependent Variables 
There are three dependent variables used in the analyses of this study: 1) the timeliness of 
the investigation; 2) the outcome/disposition of complaints filed against patrol officers; 3) type 
of discipline that was handed out to patrol officers named in the complaints.  The length, or 
timeliness, of the investigation was operationalized as a continuous variable.  Specifically, it was 
measured by the number of days from when the complaint was assigned to an investigator to the 
date that the investigator noted that the investigation was finished.  Currently, no research has 
operationalized timeliness of the investigation, but police departments and police auditors 
usually refer to the number of days as a measure of length (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  The 
mean length of time for an investigation to be completed was 24.69 days.  
Using similar measures to Hassell and Archbold (2010), the disposition of complaints 
was operationalized as a dichotomous variable with complaints that are not sustained coded as 
zero (n=54) and complaints that are sustained coded as one (n=212).  When the investigation 
revealed sufficient evidence to support the allegations made in the complaint, it is sustained. 
Complaints that were not sustained include cases where the investigation failed to disclose 
sufficient evidence to support the allegation.  It may also have been the case that the acts 
providing the basis for the complaint occurred, but were justified, lawful, or proper.  Further, 
when the investigation proved that the allegation was false or the basis for the complaint was 
fabricated, a complaint was not sustained. 
The third dependent variable is the type of discipline that the officers received.  The type 
of discipline was also coded as a dichotomous variable with minor discipline coded as zero and 
serious discipline coded as one.  Minor disciplinary action included verbal consultation (n=16) or 
letter of consultation (n=106) while serious disciplinary action included a letter of reprimand 
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(n=61), suspension (n=18), employee resignation (n=3) or termination (n=10).  These are 
regarded as serious because it becomes a part of an officer’s permanent file (Hassell & Archbold 
2010).  The most frequent disciplinary consequence handed out by this agency was a letter of 
consultation. 
Table 1  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Officer Variables 
 
Variable      N  Mean  SD         Range 
Officer Characteristics 
 Sex       .23  .42          0-1  
0=Male   207   
  1=Female   62   
  
Length of Service (in years)    8.06  7.39          0-33 
   
 Number of Prior Allegations    1.02  1.29          0-6 
 
 Average Citations     214.62  214.27          0-1642.6 
 
 Average Arrests     154.21  108.42          0-747.6 
 
Independent Variables 
Two police officer characteristic variables are used in the analyses. One variable included 
the sex of the officer with zero coded as male and one coded as female.  The level of experience 
was measured in years from the start date to when the complaint was filed against the officer.  
Research has consistently demonstrated that males (Hassell & Archbold, 2010; Lersch, 1998; 
Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2007; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; 
National Center for Women and Policing, 2002; Pate and Fridell, 1993) and officers with less 
experience are more likely to have complaints lodged against them (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch 
& Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004).   
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for Complaint Variables 
Variable     N  Mean  SD  Range 
 
Complainant’s Sex      .13  .33  0-1 
 0=Male    235 
 1=Female    34 
 
Number of Investigations Per Year    29.80  8.53  12-44 
          
Length of Investigation (Days)    24.62  15.73  2-77 
  
Number of Police Officers     .30  .46  0-1 
0=1 Officer    187 
1=Two or more officers  82   
 
Nature of Complaints 
 0=Police Practice   49 
 1=Work Performance   135 
 2=Department Policy   89 
  
Disposition       .80  .40  0-1 
 0=Not Sustained   54 
 1=Sustained    212 
  
Discipline                    .42  .49  0-1  
 0=Minor Discipline   122 
 1=Severe Discipline   92      
 
The nature of complaint was coded into three categories.  Police practices (n=49) make 
up the first category and includes physical complaints and nonphysical complaints.  Physical 
complaints include, for example, allegations of police use of force while nonphysical complaints 
could include harassment, abuse of authority, or verbal threats (Hassell & Archbold 2010).  The 
second category is work performance issues (n=133).  This includes behaviors such as 
dereliction of duties such as not completing reports in a timely manner (Hassell & Archbold 
2010).  The last type of complaint includes departmental policy violations (n=87), which 
includes behaviors such as verbal discourtesy to citizens or improper formal action (Hassell & 
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Archbold 2010). Two dummy variables are created in order to use the nature of the complaint as 
separate predictor variables.  For both variables, complaints for departmental policy violations 
and work performance issues are compared to improper police action complaints. The variable 
will be coded 0 for police action complaints and 1 for department policy.  The second will be 
coded 0 for police action and 1 for work performance.  Research indicates that complaints for 
departmental policy violations and work performance issues are more likely to be sustained than 
complaints for improper police action (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). 
Research has regularly demonstrated that officers who are more productive also have 
more citizen complaints (Brandl et al., 2001; Lersch, 2002; Terrill & McCluskey, 2002).  
Therefore, two productivity measures are also used as independent variables in this study.  These 
measures include the average number of arrests and average number of citations over the 10-year 
study period.  During the period studied (ten years), officers averaged 154.2 arrests and 214.6 
citations per year.  
One situational variable was used in the analysis.  Having multiple officers at the scene of 
an encounter has been shown to alter police behavior (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).  Previous 
research has also established that a complaint is more likely to be sustained if only one officer is 
present rather than if two or more officers were present (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). Having 
multiple officers present during the interaction could provide justification for the other actions 
taken by the officer (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). Further, an officer may be more likely to 
deviate from policy when not accompanied by other officers, increasing the chances of a 
sustained disposition (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). The number of police officers on the scene of 
encounters that resulted in complaints was operationalized as a dichotomous variable with zero 
coded as one officer on scene (n=187) and one coded as two or more officers on scene (n=82).  
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It is also important to include whether the police officers named in the complaints had 
previous complaints filed against them, since research tends to show a small number of officers 
tend to account for the most complaints (Christopher, 1991; Harris, 2009, 2011; Lersch & 
Mieczkowski, 1996, 2000; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001).  Goldstein (1975) labeled 
this group as problem officers.  Past research has found that history of prior use of force 
allegations is a significant predictor of subsequent investigations for using greater levels of force 
(McElvain & Kposowa, 2004).  This variable was recorded as the number of misconduct 
allegations made against the officer (Headley et al. 2017).  The number of investigations was 
also recorded for each year (2006-2015).  Having more investigations in progress could influence 
the timeliness of the investigation as well as the disposition and discipline.  The average number 
of investigations of allegations of police misconduct was 29.8.  
 
Figure 1. Number of Complaint Investigations from 2006-2015 
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Analytic Techniques  
Using SPSS version 24, the quantitative data analyses consisted of univariate, bivariate, 
and multivariate analyses. To show the relevant complaint and officer characteristics, descriptive 
statistics are provided. This was done by calculating frequencies and percentages for each 
variable. To determine if any of the independent and dependent variables are significantly 
related, bivariate correlations were calculated. Here, multicollinearity diagnostics were 
conducted to ensure no variables are highly correlated. Multicollinearity is a problem that occurs 
when there is a high correlation of at least one independent variable with a combination of the 
other independent variables.  The resulting problem is that it becomes impossible to obtain 
unique estimates of the regression coefficients (Field, 2009). Multicollinearity was tested using 
tolerance statistics, indicating whether there is a problem.  A serious problem exists if value is 
below 0.1 (Field 2009). On the other hand, Menard (1995) suggests that values below 0.2 are 
cause for concern.  In addition to tolerance scores, variance inflation factor (VIF) collinearity 
statistics were also be reported. Walker and Maddan (2005) report that while a VIF of 4 or less 
indicates no problem with multicollinearity, a VIF of 5 is acceptable.  To more closely inspect 
the bivariate correlations, a one-way ANOVA, in addition to T-tests are conducted to examine if 
there are differences in the timeliness of the investigation based on the nature, disposition, and 
discipline of the complaint. 
After the univariate and bivariate analyses were completed, the quantitative analysis was 
completed using multivariate statistics.  Different analytic techniques were performed to examine 
the influence of officer characteristics, productivity, situational context, and complaint 
characteristics on the dependent variables. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used 
for the analysis predicting the length of the investigation.  An implicit assumption in OLS 
regression is that the dependent variable is continuous (Walker and Maddan, 2005). Binary 
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logistic regression was used to determine the effect of the independent variables on the 
disposition of formal complaints and discipline after the investigations. This resulted in predicted 
probabilities between zero and one. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test was examined to 
determine if the models are correctly specified (Field, 2009). If the test statistic is found to be 
greater than 0.05, it will suggest a well-fitting model and that the model’s estimates fit the data at 
an acceptable level. IRB approval for this study was granted April 13th, 2017 in accordance with 
federal regulations under exempt category #4 (Protocol #HS17223).  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The quantitative analysis consisted of univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses. The 
characteristics of police officers are presented in Table 1.  Regarding the demographic 
characteristics of officers with allegations of misconduct, 77 percent were male.  The years of 
experience among officers with complaints ranged from 0 to 33 years, with an average of 8.06 
years.  Turning to their productivity measures, officers named in complaints averaged 214.62 
citations and 154.21 arrests per year. Lastly, 59 percent of officers with allegations of police 
misconduct had a prior complaint from 2006 to 2015.   
 When examining the complaint-level characteristics (see Table 2), most complainants 
were male (87%).  The yearly number of investigations into allegations of police misconduct 
ranged from 12 to 44 with an average of 29.8 investigations. Investigations ranged from lasting 2 
to 75 days while lasting an average of 24.69 days.  Regarding the number of officers present at 
the scene in which an allegation was made, 69.5 percent had one officer present. The majority of 
the allegations of misconduct were for work performance issues (49.4 percent), followed by 
departmental policy violations (31.9 percent), and police practice issues (17.4 percent).  
Regarding the disposition and discipline of the investigation, 80 percent of complaints were 
sustained, while 57 percent of the discipline resulting from complaints was minor.  
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Table 3  
Bivariate Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Officer Sex 1              
2. Years of Experience -.059 
 
1             
3. Average Citations -.160* 
 
.153* 
 
1            
4. Average Arrests -.165** 
 
.081 
 
.865** 
 
1           
5. Prior Complaint .032 
 
.099 
 
.109 
 
.183** 
 
1          
6. Complainant Sex .084 
 
-.030 
 
-.104 
 
-.068 
 
-.119 
 
1         
7. Yearly Investigations .071 
 
-.101 
 
-.108 
 
.013 
 
-.102 
 
-.028 
 
1        
8. Length of Investigation .008 
 
.002 
 
-.013 
 
.020 
 
-.084 
 
.106 
 
.033 
 
 
1       
9. Number of Police Officers -.036 
 
.002 
 
-.066 
 
-.038 
 
-.112** 
 
.210** 
 
.094 
 
.352** 
 
1      
10. Work Performance 
Complaint 
.090 
 
-.102 
 
-.080 
 
-.056 
 
-.023 
 
-.178** 
 
.054 
 
-.215** 
 
-.224** 
 
1     
11. Department Policy 
Complaint 
-.016 
 
.119 
 
.056 
 
.003 
 
-.061 
 
.075 
 
-.008 
 
.059 
 
.014 
 
-.683** 
 
1    
12. Police Practices Complaint -.098 
 
-.011 
 
.035 
 
.068 
 
.104 
 
.139* 
 
-.060 
 
.207** 
 
.273** 
 
-.470** 
 
-.324** 
 
1   
13. Disposition -.014 
 
-.061 
 
-.080 
 
-.044 
 
-.010 
 
-.244** 
 
-.049 
 
-.209** 
 
-.321** 
 
.116 
 
.041 
 
-.201** 
 
1  
14. Discipline .011 
 
-.005 
 
.010 
 
.009 
 
.062 
 
.045 
 
-.101 
 
.333** 
 
.155* 
 
-.008 
 
-.091 
 
.139* 
 
-.059 
 
1 
P<.05*  P<.01* 
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Bivariate Analysis 
The correlation matrix revealed a number of significant relationships between variables 
(see Table 3).  Focusing on the dependent variables of the study, five variables were significantly 
associated with the length of the investigation. First, longer investigations were correlated with 
complaints that are not sustained.  In addition, complaints for police practices and work 
performance were significantly shorter while those involving two or more officers are longer. 
Lastly, longer investigations were associated with more serious discipline.  
Three variables were significantly correlated with the disposition of the investigation.  
The negative correlation between complainant’s sex and the disposition indicates that female 
complainants were less likely to have complaints sustained.  In addition, allegations involving 
two or more officers and police practices complaints exhibited negative correlations with the 
disposition. This indicates that complaints with multiple officers and police practice complaints 
were less likely to be sustained. Regarding the discipline handed out after each investigation, 
longer investigations were more likely to yield serious discipline. Moreover, both the number of 
police officers at the interaction which resulted in the complaint and police practice complaints 
were positively correlated with discipline.  
The first research question asked whether there are differences in the timeliness of the 
investigation based on the nature, disposition, and discipline of the complaint.  To address this 
question and more closely inspect the correlational relationships with the timeliness of the 
investigation, a one-way ANOVA and T-tests were conducted. A one-way ANOVA test was 
conducted to investigate the difference in the length of investigation between the different types 
of complaints.  The complaint categories are police practices, work performance, and 
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departmental policy violations.  Results from this test revealed a significant effect of the nature 
of the complaint on length of the investigation, F(2, 237)=5.8, p=.003 (See Table 4). 
Table 4 
ANOVA for the Regression Equation, Nature of the Complaint on Length 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F 
Between 
Groups 
2787.96 2 1393.98 5.83** 
Within 
Groups 
56668.78 237 239.11   
Total 59456.73 239     
**p < 0.01 
Post-Hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for police 
practices complaints (M= 30.90, SD=2.51) was significantly different than the mean score for 
work performance complaints (M=21.72, SD=1.32) (Table 5).  Taken together, these results 
suggest that the nature of the complaint does influence the length of investigations. Specifically, 
results suggest that when internal affairs is investigating police misconduct, more time is spent 
investigating issues related to physical complaints of police use of force and nonphysical 
complaints such as verbal threats than issues related to work performance.  
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Table 5 
Tukey HSD Comparison for Length of Investigation 
    
  
95% Confidence  
Interval 
(I) 
Nature 
(J) 
Nature 
Mean 
Diff (I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Lower  
Bound 
Upper  
Bound 
Police 
Practices 
Work     
Performance 
9.18* 2.77 2.66 15.71 
  Departmental 
Violations 
5.12 2.97 -1.90 12.13 
      
Work 
Performance 
Police Practices -9.18* 2.77 -15.71 -2.66 
  Departmental 
Violations 
-4.07     2.26 -9.4 1.26 
      
Departmental 
Violations 
Police Practices -5.12 2.97 -12.13 1.90 
  Work Performance 4.07 2.26 -1.26 9.40 
* p < 0.05 
Independent samples t-tests were also used to determine if there is a difference in the 
length of the investigation based on the disposition of the complaint investigation. (see Table 6).  
On average, complaint investigations that were not sustained had a higher mean score for the 
length of the investigation (M= 31.30, SE=2.08), compared to complaints that were sustained 
(M=22.90, SE=1.14).  The difference in mean scores was statistically significant (t (235) = 3.27, 
p=.001). 
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Table 6 
Comparing Mean Length of Time for Investigation Disposition 
 Not Sustained Sustained 
 N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) 
Length* 44 31.30 (13.77) 193 22.87 (15.77) 
*P<.05 
Regarding discipline of the investigation, complaint investigations yielding serious 
discipline had a higher mean score for the length of the investigation (M= 29.33, SE=1.93) 
compared to complaints that received minor discipline (M=18.63, SE=1.22) (Table 7).  The 
difference in mean scores was statistically significant (t (141.95) = -4.69, p=.000). 
Table 7 
Comparing Mean Length of Time for Discipline of Investigation  
 Minor Discipline Serious Discipline 
 N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) 
Length* 113 18.63 (12.94) 82 29.33 (17.49) 
*P<.05 
Before the multivariate analysis was initiated, multicollinearity diagnostics were 
examined to check for tolerance scores below 0.2 (Menard, 1995). Average yearly citations and 
arrests had tolerance values of .226 and .229 respectively.  Aside from this, collinearity statistics 
did not reveal any issues as all tolerance scores were found in a range between .226 and .945.  In 
addition, all variance inflation factors were below 5, further suggesting there are no 
multicollinearity issues.  
Multivariate Analysis 
The second research question asked what factors influence the length (timeliness) of 
investigations of complaints against patrol officers?  To examine the impact of each police 
officer and complaint variable on the timeliness of the investigation, an OLS regression analysis 
was performed (See Table 8).  The results of the OLS regression indicated the predictors 
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explained 17.6% of the variance in the length of the investigation (R2=.176, F(10, 212)=4.65, 
p<.001). Results also showed that complaints involving two or more officers were a statistically 
significant predictor of length, and it indicated that those allegations increased the amount of 
time taken to investigate officer misconduct (p<.001).  This result makes intuitive sense, as more 
time would be needed to interview additional officers involved in the interaction which led to the 
complaint. Additionally, complaints involving work performance issues lessened the time taken 
to complete the investigation (p<.05). This confirms findings from the one-way ANOVA, which 
found a difference in length of the investigation based on the nature of the complaint. 
Table 8 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of Length of Investigating Officer Misconduct 
Variable     B     SE B Beta       t   p  
 
Police Characteristics 
Sex      -.814      2.304 -.023     -.353 .724  
 
Years of Experience   -.002      .128 -.001     -.016 .987  
 
Average Citations   -.010      .009 -.148     -1.089 .277  
 
Average Arrests   .021      .018 .154     1.139 .256 
 
Number of Prior Complaints  -.919      .776 -.078     -1.184 .238  
            
Complaint Characteristics 
Complainant Sex    1.752      2.970 .039      .590 .556 
 
Number of Investigations Per Year -.129      .116      -.074         -1.112 .267  
           
Number of Police Officers Involved 10.324      2.110 .322       4.892 .000*** 
  
Nature (Department Policy)  -2.365      2.833 -.074       -.835 .405 
 
Nature (Work Performance)  -5.775      2.697 -.195       2.141 .033*  
          
R2 .176        
*p ≤.05     ***p≤.001 
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Binary logistic regression was conducted to determine which factors predicted the 
disposition and discipline of complaint investigations.  Separate logistic regression models were 
conducted for each dependent variable.  Prior to interpreting the data, the independent variables 
were entered into each model and the regression model analytics were examined to ensure the 
model was a good fit for the data.  First, the model predicting the disposition of the investigation 
will be reviewed (Table 9).  The test statistic of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not 
significant, indicating the model is appropriate for the data.  Also, the model chi-square was 
statistically significant, which confirmed the model was predictive of the disposition.  
The third research question asked how the length (timeliness) of investigation of 
complaints against patrol officers affect the disposition of the investigation?  Only one police 
officer characteristic was predictive of the disposition. As the average yearly citations an officer 
had increased, so did the likelihood that complaints would not be sustained (p=.024).  Results 
also indicate that complainants who are female were less likely to have their complaints 
sustained (p=.027).  The model indicated that interactions with more than one officer which 
resulted in a complaint were less likely to be sustained compared to interactions involving only 
one officer (p=.007).   In addition, complaints alleging violations of departmental policy were 
more likely to be sustained compared to police practice complaints (p=.023).  
At the p<.10 significance level, longer investigations decreased the likelihood that a 
complaint would be sustained (p=.065). In addition, complaints for work practice issues were 
also more likely to be sustained than police practice complaints (p=.057).  This model explained 
27.7% of the variance in the disposition officers receive. 
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Table 9 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Officer and Complaint Characteristics on the 
Disposition of the Investigation 
Variable    B  SE  p         Exp (B) 
 
Police Characteristics 
Sex      .012   .508      .980  1.013   
 
Years of Experience   .007  .029  .804  1.007 
 
Average Citations   -.005  .002  .024*  .995   
 
Average Arrests   .006  .004  .150  1.006 
 
Number of Prior Complaints  -.093  .165  .571  .911  
            
Complaint Characteristics 
Complainant Sex    -1.236  .559  .027*  .290 
 
Length     -.024  .013  .065†  .976 
 
Yearly Investigations   -.029  .026  .261  .971  
           
Number of Police Officers Involved -1.133  .421  .007**  .322 
  
Nature (Department Policy)  1.264  .554  .023*  3.54  
 
Nature (Work Performance)  .941  .493  .056†  2.564  
 
Constant    3.022 
 
Model  χ2      χ2 (8, 222) = 40.48, p = .000 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test    χ2 (11, 222) = 11.09, p = .197 
           
Nagelkerke R2 = .277        
†p≤.10 
*p≤.05 
**p≤.01 
The fourth research question asked how the length (timeliness) of investigation of 
complaints against patrol officers affect the discipline recommendation of the investigation.  
Accordingly, the second binary logistic regression model was conducted to determine which 
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factors predicted the type of discipline resulting from the complaint investigation (See Table 10).  
The test statistic of the Hosmer and Lemeshow was not significant, indicating the model is 
appropriate for the data. Also, the model chi-square was statistically significant, which 
confirmed the model was predictive of a change in discipline.  Only the length of the 
investigation was found to be a statistically significant predictor (p<.001), and it indicated that 
longer investigations were more likely to yield serious discipline.  
The results of this study show that while longer investigations are less likely to result in a 
sustained compliant, they are more likely to result in serious discipline.  At first glance, these 
results do not seem to complement each other. It is possible that longer investigations are more 
likely to be for serious allegations, such as use of force or verbal threats.  Since police practice 
issues (use of force, harassment, verbal threats) are generally seen as more serious than police 
practices, it is worth examining whether these complaints are internally or externally filed in 
addition to what post-investigation decisions follow.  A cross-tabulation was conducted to 
explore who is filing what kind of complaints. This cross-tabulation revealed that among police 
practice complaints, 38.3% were filed by citizens while 61.7% were filed by police personnel.  
Further, among those complaints that were sustained, 6.1% were filed by citizens while 93.9% of 
sustained complaints were filed by police personnel.  These results demonstrate the rarity at 
which serious complaints filed by citizens are sustained.  However, when internal affairs does 
sustain a complaint, there are no meaningful differences in the discipline based on whether 
police personnel or citizens file the complaint. Taken together, the results of the preceding 
analysis suggest a process by which complaints are filed and subsequently investigated.  First, 
citizens and police personnel decide to file a complaint with the police department. Of the filed 
complaints, internal affairs must investigate and decide on a disposition.  After the disposition of 
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the investigation is decided, a disciplinary recommendation must be made.  These results show 
the importance of studying complaints of police misconduct at the different stages of the 
investigation.  
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Table 10 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating Effects of Officer and Complaint Characteristics on the 
Discipline of the Investigation 
Variable    B  SE  p         Exp (B) 
 
Police Characteristics 
Sex      .100  .399      .803  1.105   
 
Years of Experience   .004  .023  .861  1.004 
 
Average Citations   .001  .002  .552  1.001   
 
Average Arrests   -.002  .003  .576  .998 
 
Number of Prior Complaints  .189  .137  .169  1.208  
            
Complaint Characteristics 
Complainant Sex    -.066  .564  .907  .936 
 
Length     .048  .013  .000*** 1.049 
 
Number of Investigations Per Year -.027  .021  .189  .973  
           
Number of Police Officers Involved .385  .437  .379  1.469 
  
Nature (Department Policy)  -.182  .585  .756  .834  
 
Nature (Work Performance)  .198  .575  .731  1.218 
 
Constant    -.888 
 
Model  χ2      χ2 (8, 222) = 24.69, p = .010 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test    χ2 (11, 222) = 4.84, p = .774 
           
Nagelkerke R2 = .170        
***p≤.001 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this study was to determine what variables influence the timeliness of 
investigations of police misconduct. In addition, it sought to investigate how the timeliness of 
misconduct allegations may influence the disposition and discipline among relevant police 
officer and complaint characteristics. 
The quantitative analysis revealed several notable findings. Regarding the timeliness of 
the investigation, results show that allegations of police misconduct involving two or more 
officers increased the amount of time taken to investigate officer misconduct.  Since more time 
would be needed to interview each additional officer involved in the interaction which led to the 
complaint, this result is consistent with expectations.  From a procedural justice perspective, it 
should be encouraging from the complainant’s perspective that this police department appears to 
be taking the extra time needed to gather evidence to make an educated decision regarding the 
disposition and discipline.  The Justice Department’s (1990) report on the New Orleans Police 
Department noted a failure by internal affairs investigators to search for witnesses of the 
interaction which led to the complaint in addition to failing to interview other highly relevant 
witnesses. Since procedural justice refers to the fairness of the processes through which the 
police make decisions and exercise authority, one could argue that objectivity is increased by 
taking the extra time to interview more officers involved (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
The analysis also revealed that less time is taken to investigate complaints involving 
work performance compared to departmental and police practice violations.  These findings 
confirmed results from the one-way ANOVA which found a difference in length of the 
investigation based on the nature of the complaint.  This result also makes intuitive sense, as it 
would be expected that complaints alleging use of force or verbal threats made by officers are 
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more serious in nature and would take longer to investigate.  This result should also be promising 
from a procedural justice perspective.  Complainants should have more confidence in the 
complaint process when internal affairs is taking more time to investigate allegations of police 
use of force compared to an officer skipping a work shift or security detail.   
The results also revealed that more productive officers in terms of citations are less likely 
to have their complaints sustained. Previous research has established that more productive 
officers generate more complaints (Brandl et al., 2001; Hassell & Archbold, 2010; Lersch 2002).  
Therefore, it could be expected that those officers who have more frequent interactions with 
citizens will receive more complaints than those who have less interaction with the public. In 
addition, there may be more discretion being used by police officers who issue more citations as 
opposed to arresting subjects, which could result in an increase in complaints because of the 
perception that the officer is straying from policy (Smith & Damphousse, 1998).  However, as 
internal affairs is investigating these allegations, it could be the case that the officers are 
determined to be acting in accordance with policy, ultimately lowering the likelihood that a 
complaint is sustained.    
Alternatively, more productive officers in terms of writing citations could be viewed 
more positively by supervisors than officers who are not productive.  Historically, the individual 
officer's productivity is key to the effectiveness of law enforcement.  A more positive outlook 
toward productive officers may play a factor when determining whether a complaint should be 
sustained or not. From a complainant’s perspective, this is not a reassuring result for a 
“procedurally just” accountability mechanism.  If police officers who are exercising more 
discretion are also not being held accountable, citizens may have less confidence in the ability of 
the police to correct officer behavior.  
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Complainants who are female were less likely to have their complaints sustained.  This 
result contrasts with the “chivalry hypothesis” which holds that females encountering the 
criminal justice system receive preferential treatment (Visher, 1983).  Consistent with this idea, 
recent research suggests that misconduct cases involving a male complainant are less likely to 
result in a sustained finding (Headly et al., 2017). Research has also found that police often 
develop a “perceptual shorthand” that includes extralegal variables, or stereotypes about people 
in their decision-making (Holleran et al., 2010; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). This poses a question 
whether internal affairs in this department has developed stereotypical ideas about what 
constitutes real misconduct and which complainants are credible.  This is a troubling result for 
the prospects of investigating officer misconduct in a fair manner.  Any systematic bias the 
police hold against a specific group of people can be damaging to the way people view the 
police.  Complainants who are female may be less likely to view the police as providing them 
services.  Long-lasting effects could include females being less likely to file complaints in the 
future and rating the police less favorably than males, ultimately leading to a strained 
relationship. 
It was found that interactions with more than one officer which resulted in a complaint 
were less likely to be sustained compared to interactions involving only one officer.  This finding 
confirms past research which also found that a complaint is more likely to be sustained when 
only one officer is on scene at an incident resulting in a complaint (Hassell & Archbold, 2010).  
When internal affairs is determining whether the actions of an officer named in a complaint were 
lawful or proper, the addition of two or more officers is more likely to bolster the accused 
officers account.  This would lower the likelihood that a resolution is found in a complainant’s 
favor.  If this were the case, citizens without any extra non-police witnesses may feel at a 
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disadvantage when it comes to the internal affairs investigation.  By not having anything or 
anyone to corroborate their side of the story, it may decrease the likelihood that an officer is held 
accountable for their misconduct.  Conversely, interactions involving two or more officers may 
also provide extra accountability and lower the likelihood that officers will stray from standard 
operating procedure (Hassell & Archbold, 2010).  If allegations of police misconduct are not 
justified, this is a positive finding considering procedural justice principles.   
Complaints alleging violations of departmental policy and work practice issues were 
more likely to be sustained compared to police practice complaints. This could mean that serious 
allegations of use of force along with harassment and verbal threats are seen as lacking merit or 
this police department does not see them as serious. Previous studies have demonstrated that the 
likelihood of an allegation being sustained decreases as the seriousness of the charge against the 
officer increases (Box & Russel, 1975; Dugan & Breda, 1991). This finding holds negative 
consequences for procedural justice (Hassell & Archbold, 2010). A police-community 
relationship is based on the principle of legitimacy. When third-party decisions are fairly made, 
people are more willing to voluntarily accept them (Lind et al., 1993) Research also indicates 
that citizens have more favorable views of the police when treated in a procedurally just manner 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001; Mastrofski, & Parks, 1999). When legitimacy is 
compromised by unfair treatment it is possible to have a negative effect in which people do not 
hold an obligation to obey the law.  Confirming this idea, a study by Paternoster et al. (1997) 
revealed that procedural justice encourages long-term obedience to the law.  
Most notably, this study found that longer investigations decreased the likelihood that a 
complaint would be sustained.  This finding is important from a procedural justice perspective.  
Not only do longer investigations fail to hold the officer accountable for his or her actions, the 
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future effects of this are unknown.  As more time elapses between the start and the end of an 
investigation, accused police officers could commit subsequent misconduct while they are being 
investigated. Additionally, when an officer’s behavior is not corrected when warranted, it may 
increase the likelihood of future misconduct.  Conversely, longer investigations may be more 
likely to stem from serious complaints that citizens report.  The time taken to investigate 
misconduct could be a function of the evidence gathering surrounding the investigation, with the 
result more likely to favor the officer.  Evidence that is being collected could be coming from 
fellow officer testimony or other sources not likely to corroborate the complainant.  The 
complaint process is designed to hold officers accountable for their misconduct.  If police 
agencies are taking a longer time in investigating misconduct, both the accused officer and 
complainant may become frustrated with the process.  Further, longer investigations which are 
not holding officers accountable for their actions, may result in less confidence in the police for 
the citizen. 
Lastly, regarding the discipline administered after a sustained allegation, longer 
investigations were more likely to yield serious discipline.  This result is consistent with 
principles of procedural justice.  A longer investigation that is sustained may be more serious in 
nature than shorter investigations. The fact that longer investigations are resulting in serious 
discipline means that this police department is taking sustained allegations of misconduct 
seriously and holding officers accountable. 
Limitations  
Although this study has explored an uncharted area of misconduct investigations and 
found many notable statistical relationships, there are some limitations worth highlighting. First, 
using complaints of police misconduct as a data source has been criticized by some scholars. For 
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example, West (1988) labeled citizen complaints of misconduct as a “badly abused police-based 
statistic"(p.113). Other scholars have been more specific in their criticisms of complaints of 
police misconduct. Many scholars have taken issue with complaints as an indicator of police 
behavior due to issues of underreporting (Lersch, 2002; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; Walker & 
Bumphus, 1992).  Citizens may choose not to report misconduct for several reasons such as 
cynicism about the process, intimidation, or lack of information on how to file a complaint. 
Therefore, there may be a large amount of police misconduct may go undetected with complaints 
as the main data source. As a result, it could be argued that citizen allegations of misconduct may 
be an indicator of the confidence civilians have in the complaint process (Pate & Fridell, 1993; 
Walker, 1997).  Other critics oppose the use of complaints as a measure of police misconduct 
due to over reporting (Adams, 1995).  Findings from this study were gathered from one 
Midwestern agency. Because of this, findings may not be generalizable to diverse police 
agencies in diverse cities. Conducting a similar study in a community that is more diverse may 
provide different results and theoretical insights.  
The majority of data used in this study also came from internal complaints filed by 
supervisors and police officers.  As a result, this study did not control for whether the complaint 
was filed by a citizen or a police employee.  There may be considerable variation in how 
complaints filed by a police supervisor are investigated opposed to complaints filed by citizen’s.  
As the limited analysis showed, among those complaints that were sustained, 6.1% were filed by 
citizens while 93.9% of sustained complaints were filed by police personnel.  Because most of 
the complaints are internal, there may also be considerable variation among supervisors who 
decide to report officer misconduct versus those who do not.   
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This study was also limited in the police officer and citizen characteristics used in the 
analyses. For example, data on police officer education was not collected. Past research has 
demonstrated that a complaint is more likely to be sustained for less educated officers, or officers 
who had not earned four-year degrees (Manis, Archbold, & Hassell, 2008).  In addition, citizen 
age and race was not collected.  It is not known how the analysis would have been altered 
without these variables.  Recent research also finds that African American complainants are 
more likely to receive a not sustained outcome (Headly et al., 2017). These limitations present 
valid concerns; however, complaints are one part to a larger system of holding police 
accountable for their actions (Walker & Archbold, 2014). While not perfect by itself, complaints 
are one data source scholars should continue to utilize.  
Future Research 
In addition to addressing the limitations of this study, future research should continue to 
focus on the process of investigating complaints of police misconduct.  Since the current study 
revealed that longer investigations are less likely to hold accused officers accountable, it is 
important to evaluate the future consequences of longer investigations. For example, do longer 
investigations increase the likelihood of future misconduct?  Does police officer stress or job 
satisfaction change as investigations take longer?  It is also worth investigating how thorough 
internal affairs is when investigating complaints of police misconduct.  Although the time taken 
to complete investigations of police misconduct is a start to this endeavor, improved measures of 
thoroughness should be used. More specifically, does the investigation use any photographs or 
diagrams?  Were all the witnesses interviewed?  Were there any inconsistencies between the 
civilian witnesses and the police?   How objective is the IA investigator when conducting the 
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investigation?  These are worthwhile research questions that will open the “black-box” of 
investigating police misconduct.  
Future research should also look at how complainants evaluate the complaint process.  
For example, what principles of a complaint process do citizens rate as more positive than 
others?  Research also needs to look at the differences in timeliness across accountability 
mechanisms. More specifically, do complaint investigations conducted by internal affairs 
divisions take longer to conclude compared to a civilian review board?  As it stands, there is little 
research which investigates these relationships from a procedural justice perspective.  
Policy Implications  
Police accountability has developed markedly since the creation of the first American 
police departments.  However, addressing police misconduct remains a real challenge for any 
police administrator. This study demonstrated that police and complaint characteristics have the 
potential to influence different stages of the complaint process. Further, some findings from this 
study are not consistent with principles of procedural justice and could have long lasting negative 
effects.  Agency administrators and Internal Affairs Divisions should recognize the possible 
effects that these characteristics have and implement principles to safeguard the integrity of 
complaint investigations.  
To ensure timely investigations of complaints of police misconduct, police departments 
should continue to implement formal timelines to investigate allegations of misconduct (Walker 
& Archbold, 2014).  Some agencies have developed formal timelines for different stages of the 
process such as classifying/assigning complaints to an investigator, completing investigations of 
use of force complaints, and lastly completing investigations for all other complaints (Walker & 
Archbold, 2014).  In addition to formal timelines, police departments should include standards 
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and principles into their investigation process to make it proceed efficiently and fairly. Some 
agencies have developed checklists to streamline the process and safeguard the integrity of 
complaint investigations.  Checklists have been used in the medical field to decrease the amount 
of infections and deaths resulting from infections (Pronovost et al., 2006).  When addressing 
police misconduct, checklists often outline the steps to take during a complaint investigation 
such as evidence collection procedures and interviews to conduct (Walker & Archbold, 2014). A 
policy and procedure manual that includes specific directives related to developing checklists 
and other standards of investigating complaints should be adopted by police agencies. The Year-
End Report of the San Jose Independent Police Auditor (1995) found that the quality of internal 
investigation differed markedly among internal affairs staff.  It is not known to what extent 
police internal affairs have developed comprehensive policies (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  
The integrity of complaint processes can also be improved by the acceptance and prompt 
classification of complaints of police misconduct (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  A recent 
investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice found that the Office of Professional 
Accountability in the Seattle Police Department routinely disposed nearly two-thirds of citizens’ 
complaints by sending them to precincts where the quality of investigations was low (United 
States Department of Justice, 2011).  Further, police departments should locate and interview all 
witnesses, avoid conflicts of interests, prohibit hostile interviews, and probe interview 
inconsistencies (Walker & Archbold, 2014). 
In addition to timelines and checklists, some agencies will audit or re-open investigations 
as a quality control strategy (Walker & Archbold, 2014).  An auditing function allows an 
independent police monitor to continuously observe witness interviews, review tapes and case 
files, and request further investigations of complaints.  For example, the Denver Office of the 
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Independent Monitor analyzed the Denver Police complaint process and in 2006 set the goal to 
increase the timeliness of handling internal affairs investigations, assignments, and the 
imposition of discipline (Rosenthal, 2006).  With this goal in mind, the monitor recommended 
changes that improve the efficiency of investigating complaints. Soon after these changes, the 
Denver Police Department observed a decrease in the time taken to complete investigations of 
officer misconduct (Mitchell, 2010).  One strength a police auditor has, as opposed to a blue-
ribbon commission, is continuous access to departmental records.  Not only can police auditors 
make specific recommendations to continuously improve the timeliness of handling complaints, 
they can disagree with disciplinary recommendations.  For example, in 2011 the San Jose 
Independent Police Auditor disagreed with findings in 6 percent of the cases that it audited.  
Although this disagreement rate would be deemed low by critics, the continuous pressure police 
auditors place on internal affairs helps maintain the quality of investigations.  Regarding 
discipline, police departments should implement disciplinary matrices to increase consistency 
and fairness in the complaint process (Shane, 2012).     
Complaints of police misconduct are not a catch-all for problem officers. Complaints are 
just one part towards holding police officers accountable for their actions.  For example, 
complaints of police misconduct can be a part of an Early Intervention System (EIS).  An EIS is 
“best practice” as outlined Walker and Archbold (2014) to improve police accountability.  The 
premise of an EIS is to identify officers who engage in misconduct and correct behavior through 
a specific intervention, such as re-training, counseling, or another option.  An EIS seeks to 
address problem behaviors before more serious misconduct takes place. EISs are a computerized 
database of police officer performance indicators, including uses of force, citizen complaints, 
arrests, canine deployments, traffic stops, officer discipline records, use of sick leave, and 
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commendations/awards. Walker and associates (2001) found significant reductions in use of 
force and citizen complaints among officers identified by EISs in three agencies.  One of the 
main problems previously mentioned is that departments only monitor an officer for a short time 
before the period resets and the officer is given a “clean slate” (Walker & Archbold, 2014; Davis 
et al., 2002).  Police departments should consider lengthening the time limit that officers are 
monitored for to avoid this problem.  
Concluding Remarks 
Procedural justice will remain relevant for the development of police accountability into 
the future.  The policy implications mentioned are intended to eliminate negative actions of 
officers that could possibly affect perceptions of procedural justice.  As described by Walker and 
Archbold (2014) and Skogan (2008), reforms to improve police accountability within police 
departments tend to fail due to resistance from mid-level and top managers and from front line 
supervisors.  Unfortunately, these are the administrators who usually oversee and enforce 
mechanisms of police accountability.  Without these official’s support, front-line officers 
behavior can remain unchecked and misconduct not addressed.  Further, if complaint processes 
are not put under the same scrutiny as police officers, procedural justice is undermined further.  
Police departments should take it as a challenge to improve their accountability mechanisms, 
namely, complaints of police misconduct.  In a time period where much of a police department’s 
success depends on the way the community views them, it should be of the utmost importance to 
address all shortcomings in police accountability.    
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